International policy entrepreneurship and production of international public goods: the case of multilateral trade regime by TROFIMOV, Ivan D.
Journal of Economics Library 
www.kspjournals.org 
Volume 4                          December 2017                           Issue 4 
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The case of multilateral trade regime 
 
By Ivan D. TROFIMOVa† 
 
Abstract. The paper considers public goods in the realm of international governance, 
provides a framework explaining their provision, and applies it in the analysis of the trade 
policymaking in the GATT/WTO. International governance regime is seen as a public 
good; it is conceptualized as an equilibrium state, one where the extent of ideational and 
material conflicts, incongruities in policy mechanisms and the lack of institutions are 
substantially minimised. Such state is brought by policy entrepreneurship on the part of 
multiple actors. Three generic entrepreneurial functions (policy leadership, innovation and 
facilitation/coordination) are identified. Successful equilibration is characterized by the 
complementarity of entrepreneurial functions, as well as by the persistence and ingenuity of 
entrepreneurs in selecting and using specific means and instruments of entrepreneurship. 
Policy entrepreneurship is considered crucial in several areas, including problem framing, 
advocacy and coalition building, policy experimentation, and creation of the analytical 
instruments. It is also salient in moderation of conflicting positions, exercise of influence 
and management of the policy process.  
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1. Introduction 
ver since the seminal study by Kindleberger (1986) there has been 
recognitionamong international policy scholars that international public 
goods (IPGs), such as stable international monetary order, open and 
transparent international trade system and durable international peace,are produced 
at a level that is suboptimal from the global perspective and the perspective of 
individual members of international system. This has been considered a serious 
problem in international political and economic relations in the absence of 
international government. 
The economic and public policy literature on public goods (PG) has been 
voluminous, considering a variety of aspects: typology of PGs and degrees of 
publicness (Demsetz, 1970; Olson, 1971; Cornes & Sandler, 1996); political 
bargaining and contestation related to PG provision, revelation of preferences for 
PG and willingness to pay (Buchanan, 1960; Buchanan & Musgrave 1999); private 
versus government provision of PGs (Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, & Musgrave, 
1973; Ostrom, 1990; Holcombe, 1997); the distinction between optimal spending 
and adequate provision of PGs (Samuelson, 1954; Conceição, 2003); PGs as social 
constructs and policy outcomes (Wildavsky 1994; Marlmolo, 1999); dimensions of 
publicness (Kaul, 2001); technologies and aggregation methods for PG production 
(Hirshleifer, 1983).  
The literature on IPGs has been growing in the recent years, with a number of 
issues beingexamined: definition and classification of IPGs (Kaul et al., 1999; 
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Morrissey et al., 2002; Kaul et al., 2003: 96-99); optimal provision levels, models 
of IPG delivery and production technologies (Cornes, & Sandler, 1996: 221-237; 
Sandler, 2003: 131-151); institutional structures and choices pertaining to IPG 
provision (Cornes, & Sandler, 1994; Martin, 2000); financing aspects (Najman, & 
D’Orville, 1995; Kaul et al., 2002); mechanisms to foster cooperation (Sandler, 
1998; Fredriksson, 1999); the role of non-state actors in IPG provision (Edwards, 
2000; Anheier et al., 2001). 
Interactive features of IPG provision and the role of participatory decision-
making were mentioned as well (Kaul et al., 2003: 101, 103), specifically political 
aspects, intertwined domestic and multilateral governance structures, timing and 
sequencing of the decisions and negotiations, the underlying institutional reforms, 
behavioral orientations and aberrations, political myopia, organizational slack and 
the role of catalytic leadership (Cernat, 2014: 32; Sankar, 2008: 14). The complex 
process of IPG provision (and broadly of international cooperation) thus requires a 
unifying and coherent framework that would integrate the above elements. 
The main argument of this paper is that the level of IPG provision and the shape 
of resulting IPG is a result of a preceding policymaking process and multiple 
adjustments on part of numerous agents scattered across domestic and international 
fields. Importantly, the exercise of policy entrepreneurship is seen as a centerpiece 
of the provisioning process and a point of integration of the above elements.i We 
use the entrepreneurship concepts, originally developed by I.M. Kirzner (1973, 
1997) and J.A. Schumpeter (2008[1939], 1961[1911], 1987[1942]) to analyze 
economic dynamics and market process. By extending the economic 
entrepreneurship concept to international policy domain, we conceptualize 
production ii  of IPGs as an equilibration process, whereby international policy 
entrepreneurs exercise three types of entrepreneurial functions (leadership, 
recombination and coordination). The exercise of these functions reduces the scale 
and magnitude of policy conflicts, establishes solid institutions, and fosters 
negotiation process, thereby eliminating disequilibria in the international system 
and bringing IPG into being.  
The paper considers a specific type of IPGs, namely a ‚global policy outcome‛, 
or ‚governance IPG‛ (Morrissey et al., 2002: 40-41). This IPG type is 
distinguished from natural global commons and human made commons (explained 
further in the text). In addition to WTO multilateral free trade regime, examples of 
‚governance IPGs‛ include (or may include in the future) international financial 
stability regime, Global Environmental Facility (GEF), international maritime 
regime, among others. Clearly, every PG or IPG has its own unique characteristics 
and follows its own unique production path, making theoretical frameworks issue-
specific. Consideration of other IPGs would thus require modification of the 
framework presented in this paper and its elements, although we posit that basic 
entrepreneurship functions and processes will remain the same. 
The purpose of this paper is threefold: 1). To define and characterize 
‚governance IPGs‛ (Morrissey et al., 2002: 40-41) and international trade 
governance regime as a specific ‚governance IPG‛. 2). To propose a theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the process of the ‚governance IPG‛ provision, and 
to take a nuanced view of equilibration process and entrepreneurial functions. 3). 
To illustrate some possible applications of the framework in the field of 
multilateral trade governance. 
Adoption of policy entrepreneurship as a centerpiece of the synthetic 
framework allows reconsidering the IPG provisioning process (and the process of 
establishing international cooperation and conducting international reforms) from a 
manifestly dynamic and agency-based perspective. Methodologically, a framework 
could serve as a starting point for integration and cross-fertilization of multiple 
streams of literature in social science: entrepreneurship theory, economic reform 
models, constitutional political economy, institutionalism, negotiation theory, game 
theory, as well as certain contributions from public policy literature.  
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The synthetic frameworks and models have been common in public policy 
literature (e.g. multiple streams model of Kingdon, 1995; advocacy coalitions 
approach by Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). These approaches, however, were 
mostly used to analyze domestic policies. In economic literature, a cognitive-
evolutionary model by Slembeck (1997) is notable. It does not, however, consider 
entrepreneurship as a driving force. The existing literature on public 
entrepreneurship provides a non-functional view of the entrepreneur, reducing it to 
a specific case of government decision making (Wawro, 2000) or vote 
maximization by a politician (François, 2003) or to view it broadly as various 
activities that improve the functioning of the public domain and society (Boyett, 
1997; Sommerrock, 2010). The specific functions that entrepreneurs need to 
perform and the mechanics of entrepreneurial action are not explained in a 
sufficient detail, nor are the factors that can undermine the effectiveness of public 
entrepreneurship. The work by Shockley & Frank (2011) that grounds policy 
entrepreneurship in Kirzner’s theory stands as exception (albeit it does not consider 
international policy applications either).   
The balance of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers specific 
features of ‚governance‛ IPGs and identifies the problem of ‚governance 
IPG‛provision. The current approaches to international cooperation and their 
shortcomings are briefly reviewed. Following that, in Section 3the issue of 
institutional and policy disequilibria is discussed, and the equilibration and policy 
entrepreneurship concepts are presented. The possibility of adaptation of these 
concepts to international public policy and IPG domains is examined, and tentative 
mapping of entrepreneurial functions with particular agents is performed. Section 4 
considers particular entrepreneurial functions at agenda-setting and negotiation 
stages of IPG provision and the factors that constrain or enable entrepreneurship. 
The concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.  
2. Characteristics of ‚governance IPGs‛ and production 
problem 
PGs are defined as such commodity, the consumption of which by one party 
does not reduce the quantity available for consumption by another party, and for 
which it is impossible or expensive to exclude party from consumption, i.e. the two 
properties of PG are non-rivalry and non-excludability (Samuelson, 1954: 387; 
Stiglitz, 1995). Respectively, the IPGs are such PGs whose benefits are available 
internationally and can be enjoyed by more than one country. Semantically, the 
terms IPG and global public good (GPG) are used interchangeably; however the 
former is preferable, as ultimate benefits may not beattributed to everyone on the 
globe (Morrissey et al., 2002: 34). In the case of international trade policy, for 
instance, the multilateral trade liberalization in WTO would not apply to non-
participants to WTO and would not concern autarkic economies like North Korea.  
This general definition, however, requires further elaboration, as far as 
production of IPGs (and ‚governance IPGs‛ specifically) is concerned. 
Firstly, the characteristic feature of the ‚governance IPG‛ is that it results from 
deliberate policy action on part of many agents, domestic or international. It is 
distinguished from natural global commons (e.g. atmosphere or ozone layer) that 
exist irrespective of human action, or human made commons (e.g. global stock of 
knowledge or international standards) that are produced by humans, but not 
through policy process (Kaul et al., 1999: 454). 
Secondly, the ‚governance IPG‛ is an intermediate PG, i.e. a precursor and 
enabler of final PGs (Aussilloux et al., 2002; Sapovadia, 2003). The benefits from 
the production of ‚governance IPGs‛do not flow directly to the consumers. Instead, 
the benefits that ‚governance IPG‛ brings include risk reduction and capacity 
enhancement, rather than direct provision of utility (Morrissey et al., 2002: 37-38). 
In the case of multilateral trade regime, the benefits from IPG would include 
creation of stable regime that would allow unhindered flow of goods and services 
(i.e. free trade that will bring ultimate benefits to consumers in the form of greater 
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diversity, better quality and lower price of goods), and that would reduce the 
likelihood of adversarial trade practices (dumping, export subsidization) damaging 
international economic and political relations.  
Thirdly, World Bank (2001: 133) and Morrissey et al., (2002: 38) distinguish 
core activities (production of IPG) and complementary activities to make them 
avail(financing of IPG). In the case of ‚governance IPG‛, the former aspect is 
central. While for human-made commons, the financing and provision is frequently 
done by an international agency with a global remit (e.g. provision of Ebola 
vaccine through WHO), in the case of international economic regimes such 
agencies may be absent (IMF and World Bank operate guided by pre-defined 
mandate, while WTO is akin to negotiation forum). The provision of ‚governance 
IPG‛ is thus a construction process (‚governance IPGs‛ being ‚public by design‛), 
with political and policymaking aspects coming to the forefront (Kaul et al., 1999: 
90-91). The impediments to ‚governance IPG‛ provision would be not of financing 
nature, but rather of international negotiation and domestic bargaining (domestic 
political constraints prevent or delay concessions at international negotiation table, 
as demonstrated by Putnam, 1988). Importantly, as opposed to conventional 
thinking in PGs literature (for a survey see Oakland, 1987), the state, bureaucracy 
and formal procedures are likely to play important, but not exclusive role in the 
provisioning process (Kaul et al., 1999). The analysis of PG production will thus 
need to focus on a broader set of stakeholders and actors. Finally, the provisioning 
process is unlikely to be deterministic and linear: most designed PGs follow 
‚complex, multidimensional, multilayered, multifactored production path‛ (Kaul et 
al., 1999: 101). 
Fourthly, ‚governance‛ IPG is typically not a pure PG, as is the case of many 
PGs even at a national level (Sandler, 1997; Mendez, 1992). Excludability can be 
ensured in certain ways: only those countries that are members of the governance 
forum can enjoy the benefits stemming from a constructed regime or policy. The 
rivalry may also be present: in many instances ‚governance IPGs‛ are provided at a 
high level of generality and with varying degrees of obligation, i.e. ‚governance 
IPG‛ by its nature does not regulate or prescribe each and every aspect of 
international transaction or activity and therefore does not guarantee the complete 
absence of conflicts or failures. In this case, not every party, country or stakeholder 
will be able to enjoy the final benefits (e.g. the existence of UN Security Council 
did not prevent many of the wars; likewise the existence of WTO does not 
guarantee the absence of trade conflicts). Regarding multilateral trade regime, 
GATT/WTO regime provides the benefits to all signatories to the GATT by means 
of the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause (trade advantages given to one state are 
extended to all other states). Clearly, MFN clause applies only to GATT/WTO 
members, and hence non-excludability condition is satisfied only partially (i.e. 
GATT/WTO regime is a ‚club‛ good, albeit a very inclusive club). However, since 
most economies are now GATT/WTO members, for practical purposes it is 
feasible to consider that non-excludability is ensured. We note, however, that the 
degree of excludability is higher in regional trade governance (e.g. free trade 
benefits within EU extend only to its 28 members). As to non-rivalry, the 
mechanism of trade barriers reduction is based on first-difference reciprocity (i.e. 
the GATT signatories reciprocally agree on the size of tariff cuts, but not the 
resulting level of tariffs, meaning that certain countries or stakeholders therein may 
not get an adequateshare of benefits from tariff reduction). Also, certain 
agreements made in GATT/WTO (on civil aircraft, government procurement etc) 
have plurilateral nature, i.e. open for joining on a voluntary basis and extending 
benefits only to signatories or outright discriminating certain signatories. Finally, 
certain protectionist and trade-distorting measures have been permitted in certain 
trade areas, such as trade in agricultural commodities. Overall, multilateral trade 
regime in WTO may be conceived as ‚governance IPG‛ with a ‚partial degree of 
publicness‛.  
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Fifthly, in contrast to other IPGs for which the act of provision is clearly 
defined, the fact that ‚governance IPG‛ was indeed provided and governance 
regime is functioning (enabling consumption of ultimate benefits) is frequently 
indeterminate. Kaul et al., (1999) mention potential PGs: i.e. the PGs that despite 
their non-rivalry and non-excludability characteristics may not be de facto public in 
consumption. GATT/WTO regime is a potential PG, i.e. it is public in form (de 
jure), but not always in substance (de facto). This means that ongoing collective 
action is required on the part of GATT signatories to prevent and proscribe actual 
trade practices that are at variance with GATT principles and to make GATT 
regime a ‚real‛ PG. Such practices include deliberate efforts by certain countries to 
limit the extent of public benefits from free trade through geographical and 
regional discrimination against non-participants to regional trade blocs, or attempts 
to delay implementation of GATT agreements or to make use of loopholes and 
‚grey areas‛ in the GATT system and thereby ‚legalize‛ national protectionist 
policies, or actions that outright contravene GATT rules and result in trade 
disputes. Indeed, as argued by some observers (Lemieux, 1989), the history of the 
GATT is an ongoing attempt to realize its true potential, by turning it from a mere 
stop-gap mechanism, preventing closure of the markets and rise of protectionism 
into a working ‚free trade charter‛. In fact, many observers and scholars are 
skeptical about the potential of the GATT/WTO: as argued by Cernat (2004), the 
PGs that GATT Uruguay Round (1986-1994) intended to deliver simply never 
showed up; as put by Sapovadia (2003), the benefits of both intermediate and final 
IPGs in international trade domain may never eventuate.  
Sixthly, the valuation and demand issues are rather distinct from other PG 
types. Theoretically, knowledge of the demand curve for the PG and of willingness 
to pay (WTP) is needed. But as Fudenberg & Tirole (1991: 274-288) state, agents 
are unlikely to reveal WTP truthfully and are likely to strategically misrepresent 
these values. Such actions are all too common in international negotiation, 
implying that the knowledge about demand for and supply of ‚governance IPG‛ is 
obtained incrementally during the process of agenda setting and negotiation. The 
benefits of ‚governance IPGs‛ are intangible and their quantification is not an easy 
task. While the estimates of potential benefits of trade liberalization or of the 
reduced risks (e.g. if the new financial regulatory regime is obtained) are available, 
there is no guarantee whatsoever that the value of actual benefits will be anywhere 
equal or similar to the estimates. The values of benefits and costs pertaining to 
‚governance IPG‛ are determined through the political process (Barrett, 2002: 48-
49). Specifically, the costs of ‚governance IPG‛ production may be embodied in 
the time spent by the relevant parties on constructing the governance agreement, 
while the benefits are the propitious attributes of the agreement (e.g. the degree to 
which the agreement promotes free trade and contains liberalization clauses). 
Clearly, the costs and benefits are not known ex ante, prior to negotiation or agenda 
setting (Barrett, 2002: 74). In many instances, the partial supply of ‚governance 
IPGs‛ is not possible: if the time and negotiation costs are excessive, the 
negotiation is not concluded and governance regime is not obtained, and thereby 
benefits do not result. 
Seventhly, ‚governance IPGs‛ are not produced, but rather co-produced by 
several countries. Hence some of them take a lead and play a greater role in the 
production process (in terms of time costs or political concessions made on their 
part). The costs can be reduced if a coalition of like-minded economies pushing for 
new governance regime is formed and operates (as was the case of a coalition of 
agricultural exporters, pushing for free agricultural trade during the GATT 
Uruguay Round). Thus the aggregate supply of a ‚governance IPG‛ (Sandler, 
1998; Thoyer, 2002; Hirshleifer, 1983) is not purely additive (proportionate 
contribution of individual economies to supply). Instead, it follows a ‘best shot’ 
mode of supply (where the overall supply of IPG hinges on the largest individual 
contributor). We note, however, that while governance regime is brought in by 
certain largest contributors, the ultimate agreement or design is not obtained until 
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the interest of the resisting party (or weakest contributor) is satisfied. Thus, the 
‘weakest link’ mode of supply (when the overall supply depends on the 
contribution of the weakest contributor’s effort) may also be plausible. 
Eighthly, IPGs are generally including substantial stock component, i.e.  ‚their 
impact depends upon a stock of a capital-like variable that accumulates over time‛ 
(Nordhaus, 2006: 92). Nordhaus in the case of ‚governance IPGs‛ mentions 
institutional stocks and institutional inertia. This implies that provision 
of‚governance IPG‛ and its benefits are to a certain extent the function of existing 
institutions and rules. In the case of the international trade regime, the shape of 
liberal regime is determined not solely or mostly at the negotiation table, but 
domestically through institutional change and demise of protectionist policies. 
Nordhaus talks about depreciation rates, which may be high or low. In the case of 
trade governance, the depreciation rate for protectionism (‚global public bad‛) has 
been rather low in many areas (e.g. in the agricultural trade that was exempted 
from free trade principles for a substantial period of time). 
Ninthly, Kaul et. al., (1999: 371-7) mention that supply of IPG is not a one-time 
event, but rather an iterative construction that is subject to reversals and impasses 
and that involves the  gradual building of the relevant PG from various policy 
inputs and building blocks. 
A dynamic framework rooted in entrepreneurship would therefore 
complement(and to certain extend contrast) the previous theoretical approaches to 
international cooperation: that focus on external perturbations or crises triggering 
policy reform or policy formation (Gourevitch, 1986; Rodrik, 1992); that 
emphasize the role of domestic political factors in international policymaking 
(domestic coalitions and alignments, Frieden, 1991, Hiscox, 2002; rent-seeking and 
endogenous policy formation, Frey, 1984, Magee et al., 1989, Jones, & Krueger, 
1990; national government autonomy, Katzenstein, 1978, Krasner, 2009); that look 
at domestic and international constitutions to overcome impediments to IPG 
provision (incorporation of free trade agreement provisions into domestic law, 
Tumlir, 1982; unilateral free trade and flat tariff constitutional clauses, Rowley et 
al., 1995, Parisi, 1998; free trade legal enforcement, Roessler, 1985); that consider 
institutional constraints on international policies (structure of power of legislatures 
and protectionism, McCormick, & Tollison, 1981; the power of executive branch, 
Destler, 1986); game-theoretical approaches that consider formation of 
mechanisms to foster cooperation (repeated interaction in prisoners’ dilemma, 
Runge, 1984; reciprocity, Axelrod, 1984; the number of participants, nature of 
issue, potential games from cooperation and the likelihood of cooperation, Olson, 
1971; Barrett, 1999). 
Methodologically, we contend that the complete explanation of IPG provision 
and international cooperation would require consideration of factors that enable 
change rather than constrain it (Sen, 1969) and of the processes through which 
domestic political and ideational conflicts are moderated and stable policy ‚core‛ is 
formed; the analysis of interplay between domestic and international arena and of 
the multi-speed change in policy settings and instrumentsand underlying 
institutions; the analysis of multiple forms of leadership and policy innovation in 
addition to factors that constrain them and reduce their effectiveness; view of 
international cooperation and IPG provision as organic process that is not reduced 
to a set of mechanisms and that follows multiple logics (political feasibility and  
appropriateness in addition to economic optimality). Respectively, some of the 
previous contributions to the literature will be useful and instrumental: specifically, 
two-level game models emphasizing domestic constraints for international 
negotiations (Putnam, 1988), international policy explanations that stress the 
importance of ideas and culture (Rohrlich, 1987; Goldstein, 1988), constitutional-
contractarianviews of policy, in particular those that consider continuity and 
interactive nature of constitutional bargaining (Buchanan, 2004; Herrmann-Pillath, 
2006), as well as certain negotiation theories (models of negotiation as a 
management process, Winham, 1977). 
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3. Public entrepreneurship and IPG provision 
3.1. International policy disequilibria 
The starting point for IPG provision analysis is recognition of disequilibria that 
exist in international policy system. We distinguish four possible disequilibria. 
D1. Policy vacuum exists and the economic processes are not regulated 
internationally, directly affecting respective actors. The absence of governance 
regime for international speculative capital flows is an example of such 
disequilibria. 
D2. Policies and governance structures exist, but do not operate as intended 
originally and/or do not satisfy the aspirations and needs of policy recipients. 
Policy problems and inconsistencies accumulate and should require reforms and 
change in the future. Examples of such disequilibrium include unsatisfactory 
functioning of UN Security Council mechanism or failing regime for international 
protection of intellectual property rights. 
D3. The policy is negotiated, but the conflict between policy actors is in full 
swing – their strategies and actions are not matching, their behavioural attitudes 
towards each other and towards current and potential policies do not allow any 
settlement, their proposals and solutions to the policy problem do not fit. This is the 
reality of all negotiations - the disequilibria are eliminated with new policies 
obtained that suit everyone or with ‚stop-gap‛ policies that will require re-
negotiation later on; alternatively, if negotiations fail, the disequilibrium persists.  
D4. The institutional disequilibrium appears when the divergence and intense 
contestation of ideas either preclude formation of any institution, or make the 
existing institutions untenable, with new ideas coming to the forefront and starting 
to look attractive or old ideas becoming inadequate for regulation. Formulation of 
policy instruments becomes impossible without underlying solid institution. 
Examples of institutional equilibrium include current controversies on global 
climate change, pervaded by ideological and interpretative rifts; or Washington and 
Beijing Consensus controversies on international development. In contrast to 
rational choice institutionalism (that views institutions as rules of the game and 
laws that constrain behavior, North, 1990), we adopt a definition of institutions as a 
sociological or cultural phenomenon (DiMaggio, & Powell, 1991; Scott, 2001). 
Institutions are conceptualized as a set of views held by policy actors of what the 
social reality around them looks like and associated beliefs/contentions of what the 
policy ought to be to conform to these views (Myrdal, 1944; Bromley, 2006: 27). 
Given that almost every policy and social issue involves alternative interpretations, 
beliefs and views, institutional construction is a process of contestation of ideas 
and views.  
All four disequilibria mentioned above may amplify one another or be 
superimposed, for example, policy negotiation problems during initial policy 
creation (D1 and D3), or a lack of commonly held views regarding policy reform 
and modification (D2 and D4). The case of agricultural trade talks during Dillon 
and Kennedy Rounds in the GATT illustrates the point. Apart from usual 
negotiation deadlocks (D3), D1 and D4 disequilibria were present: one of the 
parties (EC) was in the process of constructing its agricultural policies and 
institutions. At the same time the farm policies in the other party (USA) were 
experiencing problems: burdened by unplanned effects, they required adjustments 
and reforms, with externalisation of domestic problems being one of the options 
(S2). Unsurprisingly, no agricultural trade policy settlement was reached in these 
rounds. 
 
3.2. International policy equilibrium 
In contrast, in international policy equilibrium, the contradictions and conflicts 
are (partially) resolved. A new institutional arrangement integrating previously 
conflicting visions is obtained; the strategies and proposals are fitted together to the 
mutual satisfaction of parties; the influence of behavioural constraints, precluding 
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agreement, is minimized; and the policy inconsistencies are eliminated and 
substituted with more solid policy constructs. The attainment of such equilibrium 
would signify that ‚governance IPG‛ has been produced. ‚Governance IPG‛ is thus 
conceptualized as such governance arrangement that brings stability and 
equilibrium to the international policy system, thereby allowing consumption of 
final IPGs (free trade, stable international finance, durable international peace etc). 
By-products and side effects of the ‚governance IPG‛ may be present, e.g. reduced 
likelihood of war and more neighbourly international relations that result from 
liberal international trade regime (Conybeare, 1984). In international trade 
governance domain, equilibrium would mean full application of GATT/WTO 
principles, their extension to previously uncovered areas (agricultural trade, 
government procurement, services etc.), the reform of underpinning trade policies 
and practices (specifically outlawingof adversarial practices, such as dumping, 
non-tariff barriers, export subsidization), domestic policy reform (provided that 
domestic policies have spillover effects on international trade) and enforcement of 
free trade principles. 
The realities of multilateral trade governance clearly demonstrate that at 
present, such policy equilibrium is more a theoretical construct, i.e. liberalization 
has been partial and incomplete.    
The existence of multiple disequilibria also implies that the equilibration 
process will eliminate them sequentially, rather than at the same time. The regime 
reform, in this respect, will first involve adjustment of existing policies (i.e. 
elimination of (S2) disequilibrium), conducted by few policymakers, without any 
contentious negotiation with other actors. If such adjustment fails, then more 
radical reform will have to include formation of new institutions, as well as more 
intense policy negotiation. 
Entrepreneurship is seen as a driving force in establishing international policy 
equilibrium, both when it comes to construction and adjustment of policy settings 
and instruments, and when establishment of underlying institutions is concerned. 
3.3. Policy entrepreneurship as equilibration force 
In the public policy literature (Kingdon, 1995; Mintrom, & Norman, 2009), 
policy entrepreneurs are defined as actors in the government, interest groups or in 
research organisations who are willing to invest their resources in hope of future 
return and who have motivation to change current ways of doing things in 
particular policy area. Beyond this general definition, the concept of policy 
entrepreneurship is rather vague. It is acknowledged that policy entrepreneurs 
display social acuity (Mintrom, & Norman, 2009: 651), define problems and build 
teams, use policy ‚windows of opportunity‛ to enact change, and that they possess 
superior negotiation skills. However, a more formal and elaborate view of policy 
entrepreneurship that would define precise roles and activities of entrepreneurs is 
lacking.     
We argue that by applying the insights of I. M.Kirzner and J. A. Schumpeter in 
the field of IPG analysis, a more complete and accurate representation can be 
obtained that: 
1). Emphasizes entrepreneurial function, rather than lists particular 
entrepreneurs; 
2). Establishes the collective nature of international policy entrepreneurship; 
and 
3). Identifies generic entrepreneurial functions that are performed in all 
instances of IPG provision. 
According to Kirzner (1973; 1997), economic actors possess inadequate 
knowledge of the best ways to maximize their utilities and profits. As a 
consequence, they make inferior plans - ‚either plans that are doomed to 
disappointment ex post‛ (over-optimism mistakes) or ‚plans which fail to exploit 
existing market opportunities‛ (over-pessimism mistakes). The function of 
entrepreneur is to help correct and improve these plans, by exploiting profit 
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opportunities that exist in a market in disequilibrium (e.g. through arbitrage) and 
leading lead economic system to an optimal allocation of resources to more highly 
valued uses, i.e. to equilibrium. 
Similar decision-making ignorance, inferior plans and disequilibria are present 
in public policy. Policy actors may be deficient in attending to policy problem and 
acting upon it. Unsubstantiated expectations about other actors’ compliance during 
negotiation may be present; over-optimistic assumptions about swiftness of 
consensus and agreement-making may be frequent. A full arsenal of means 
(negotiation strategies and tactics) to attain policy agreement may be left unused 
and there may be ‚unpleasant‛ discoveries that the full negotiation process 
potential has not been exploited, i.e. better moves could have been made, or that 
certain actions should have been avoided. Overall, the realities of policymaking 
are: lengthy agenda setting, protracted issue definition, uneasy consensus-making,  
tedious talks with stalemates, reversals and confrontation that delay provision of 
IPG or preclude provision altogether. This justifies and necessitates the exercise of 
entrepreneurship to correct the mistakes and foster agenda setting and negotiation.   
We note that while in original Kirznerian analysis actors make bids and offers 
over existing objects of purchase and sale, in the policy process these objects have 
to be defined first. Actors have to establish whether the conditions should be 
classified as problems and this can become the first source of ‚over-optimism‛ in 
the process. Actors interested in IPG provision may find that their arguments about 
the necessity of the change are not attended to or accepted by the opposition, either 
due to their ignorance or vested interests (e.g. protectionism). They may also 
mistakenly believe that their policy proposals are attractive to the opposition.  
In the case of international trade policy reform, the buyers of the reform 
(countries interested in liberalisation) overoptimistically believe that their offer 
price is high enough; whereas, the sellers (protectionist states) actually consider the 
price to be too low; thus reform transaction does not occur. When talking about 
reform price, it becomes clear that buyers’ price is not a numerical figure, but 
rather a bundle of offers and inducements contained in a negotiation proposal, 
which can increase the attractiveness of the latter in the eyes of the reform seller. 
Similarly, the seller price is defined as a set of conditions that a buyer has to fulfil 
to finalise the reform deal.  
Likewise, those actors opposing the change or not interested in IPG provision 
may find that their earlier expectations (that status quo will not be disturbed and 
that policy issues will not be put on agenda) were not realised; they also mistakenly 
believe that pro-reform actors are satisfied with the opposition’s negotiation 
position and proposals that reform should not take place. 
This situation is analogous to the one, depicted by Kirzner – in both cases 
(market and policy process) overoptimism about actors’ own plans (prices in the 
former and policy proposals in the latter) and about the willingness of the other 
side to accept them, leads to subsequent frustration; thus, preventing actors from 
reaching a correct estimate of each other’s willingness to buy and sell. As a result, 
the purchase-sale transaction does not take place and both market and policy 
systems are in disequilibrium. In the policy system, the lack of agreement about the 
necessity and timing of a transaction and divergence of prices between pro- and 
anti-reform actors prevents them from achieving stable order.  
We hypothesize that Kirznerian coordination to minimise the over-optimism 
mistake includes activities that facilitate agenda formation (persuasion of reluctant 
actors to tackle the problem and identification of external conditions that can assist 
this task) as well as activities at the negotiation stage that moderate negotiation 
positions and proposals.  
The over-pessimism mistake, mentioned by Kirzner (recognition by 
buyers/sellers that completed transactions had been suboptimal and that they had 
not fully exploited profit opportunities) is also encountered in the policy 
equilibration context.  
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Importantly, the profit opportunities that arise from possibilities for profitable 
exchange (i.e. from spatial and temporal price discrepancies in economic markets 
or differentials in electoral markets) are not present in the policy system. While in 
the product and factor markets there already exist goods with respect to which 
arbitrage and speculation can be performed and profits extracted, in the policy 
system this good (future policy) has yet to be devised during negotiations. 
However, if we view profit as a potential benefit (rather than an exchange 
discrepancy) for pro-reform actors, that is experienced once the new policy is 
attained, the speedy termination of a negotiation process that would deliver these 
benefits can be seen as a profit opportunity for those actors.  
Kirznerian coordination entrepreneurship will thus include activities to exploit 
this profit opportunity: utilisation of the whole arsenal of strategic and tactical 
means to foster the negotiation process in order to achieve a new policy (both 
adversarial actions that make the opposition more pliant, as well as offers that 
could benefit all parties). Inability to handle and manage the policy negotiation 
process would then be a failure of Kirznerian entrepreneurship, even if initial 
consensus to attend to the policy problem and realistic expectations of the opposing 
party’s position are present. In the case of trade policy reform, the mistake implies 
that ‚buyers‛ (those interested in liberalization) have no means to make 
protectionist countries compliant with reform demands. 
We note, following Mises (1996[1949]: 252-253) and Kirzner (1973: 15) that 
entrepreneurship is a function that can be performed by multiple (or preferably all) 
actors and that Kirznerian policy entrepreneurship can be performed by the same 
actors who in other circumstances could have behaved un-entrepreneurially. 
Despite this, a mapping of entrepreneurial functions with specific actors may be 
justified given that position of an actor (or its mandate and capacity) may influence 
the degree of entrepreneurship or make particular entrepreneurial functions more 
likely. 
The paper also adopts the concept of entrepreneurship developed by 
Schumpeter (1961[1911], 1987[1942], 2008[1939]). In Schumpeter’s original 
formulation, entrepreneur is seen as an agent that brings novelties into the 
economic system by means of leadership, thereby overhauling entire economic 
sectors and opening new avenues for economic development. 
Schumpeter (1987[1942]) argued that entrepreneurial leadership is a 
phenomenon that can also be encountered in both economic realm and in politics 
and public decision making. ‚Collectives act almost exclusively by accepting 
leadership – this is the dominant mechanism of practically any collective action.‛ 
(p. 270) 
Schumpeter purports that the behaviour of economic and political leaders-
entrepreneurs is characterised by radicalism, with which both types position 
themselves in the surrounding economic and political environment. Instead of 
working in the deadwood of existing political structures, the Schumpeterian 
political leader would radically change the political terrain. Similarly to the 
Schumpeterian economic entrepreneur, making qualitative non-incremental 
changes in the economic system (introducing new products, developing new 
production methods, discovering new markets or devising new organisational 
methods), the Schumpeterian political entrepreneur makes major punctuations in 
the political system. 
Schumpeter’s idea that leaders are driven by predominantly non-material 
impulses and are not pure wealth maximisers finds application in international 
public policy. The motives of top leaders include preservation of good relations 
with other countries to which provision of IPG (e.g. those that help resolving trade 
conflicts) could contribute; or construction of agreements that would allow 
progress in other areas and with other IPGs. The possibility of the exercise of 
leadership at lower levels of the government was not mentioned by Schumpeter. 
Following Mintrom & Norman (2009) and Stiller (2010), however, we consider 
leadership by expert community and external stakeholders who may be interested 
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in genuine social and policy improvements (ideational leadership), or even by pro-
reform bureaucratic factions who are less corrupted by vested interests. 
Regarding the mechanism of entrepreneurial leadership in the context of IPG 
provision, we posit that it involves radical reconfiguration of the international 
policy domain (in line with Schumpeter’s original view). At the pre-negotiation 
stage of IPG provision, the reconfiguration of the domain is achieved by injecting 
and forcing new interpretations of policy problems and new policy ideas and 
thereby setting desired agenda for policy formation in a system that is dominated 
by pro-status quo actors. At the negotiation stage, when divisions between pro- and 
anti-reform actors widen and the reform is delayed, entrepreneurial leaders can 
reconfigure the talks: intervene into the political wrangle, make crucial decisions 
themselves and thus bring reform into existence.  
We note that Schumpeter did not confine his analysis of entrepreneurship to the 
exercise of leadership. While in earlier works the accent was put on a heroic 
industrial leader as initiator and carrier of innovation and on ‚creative destruction‛ 
processes in the economy, in later works Schumpeter (2008[1939]) recognised that 
entrepreneurship can be exercised collectively (e.g. in corporate entities), inducing 
discontinuities and disruptions of a smaller magnitude, with technological 
innovation taking incremental form (‚creative accumulation‛ process). 
We argue that this second facet of entrepreneurship can be discovered in the 
IPG delivery process. While the Schumpeterian political leader continues to be 
important (challenging the ideational foundations of policy or forcing negotiations 
into the desired direction), many policy innovations can be brought by recombinant 
activities of Schumpeterian policy entrepreneurs. Actors conduct trial-and-error 
tinkering with policy elements and mechanisms (adjust instruments, redefine short 
term goals and targets, without changing the underlying ideational and institutional 
core) and create new analytical instruments that could be helpful in discussions at 
agenda setting stage. Also, in the negotiation setting, entrepreneurs construct 
agreement from available proposals, submissions and designs of parties to 
negotiation. 
Another insight present in Schumpeter’s later works is that innovation is a 
combination of knowledge drawn from different sources. Significant portion of 
innovation in modern capitalist economies results from collective incremental 
activities of a large number of quite unremarkable actors (rather than heroic 
figures) within or outside the firm. In a similar vein we hypothesize that policy 
novelties can be made by non-policymakers, by actors somewhat extrinsic to the 
core of the policy system, e.g. by the expert community. Their contribution, while 
not radical or decisive as such, can nonetheless have significant repercussions for 
the policy formation process and IPG delivery. 
Overall, three types of international policy entrepreneurship are distinguished: 
Kirznerian facilitation and coordination, Schumpeterian leadership, and 
Schumpeterian recombination.  
 
3.4. Complementarity of entrepreneurial functions 
In contrast to Loasby (1982) who considered Kirznerian and Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurship as fundamentally different types of action, and Choi (1995) who 
postulated similarity between two types (Kirznerian entrepreneur operating in 
single-period and Schumpeterian in multiple-period markets), the complementarity 
view advanced by Boudreaux (1994) looks more plausible. The means to achieve 
equilibrium are diverse and both types of entrepreneurship move economy towards 
equilibrium: Schumpeterian entrepreneur by innovating and bringing qualitative 
improvements in the economy, Kirznerian by improving operation of the markets. 
In the international public policy realm, both types would be instrumental in 
providing IPGs. The Schumpeterian entrepreneur would ‚produce‛ new policy and 
‚lead‛ the provisioning process, whereas the Kirznerianwould ‚facilitate‛ and 
‚coordinate‛ it.  
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3.5. Taxonomy of entrepreneurs in international trade governance 
Acknowledging the primacy of entrepreneurial function over particular 
entrepreneurial actor we consider what agents performed the aforementioned 
entrepreneurial functions. GATT/WTO domain is examined as a specific case. 
The argument is that the same people (or groups) can perform several types of 
entrepreneurship. Trade ministers and representatives may act as Schumpeterian 
leaders and at the same type may help devise negotiation proposals (Schumpeterian 
recombination). WTO Director General has the ability to use his power to direct 
the negotiation process and influence the negotiation outcome (Schumpeterian 
leadership), and can also behave as a mediator and initiator of discussions, thus 
detecting policy discrepancies and facilitating the negotiation process (Kirznerian 
coordination and facilitation). Also, although not part of the mandate, he could 
participate (and de facto frequently did this) in the negotiation process, by making 
negotiation proposals (Schumpeter recombination). 
Similarly, a particular entrepreneurial function can be performed by multiple 
actors with interests in the policy outcome. Apart from bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship (Murphy, 1971; Ebner, 2006: 507), entrepreneurship by external 
stakeholders (defined as all actors apart from government bureaucrats and 
international officials), this has been a common practice in numerous international 
talks (Sebenius, 1984: 18; Betsill, & Corell, 2001; Bruhl, 2010: 181-199). 
In the GATT/WTO trade talks, four types of actors likely to perform Kirznerian 
and Schumpeterian entrepreneurial functions are distinguished: a) top domestic 
political leaders (heads of state and ministers); b) top international bureaucrats 
(officials in the WTO Secretariat, WTO Director General); c) middle level political 
figures – national negotiators and domestic bureaucrats (located across national 
trade policy systems); and d) external stakeholders, including the community of 
policy economists. 
Firstly, in contrast to other higher priority areas or IPGs, such as national 
security that witness greater involvement of top figures, the involvement of top 
national figures in trade negotiations tends to be sporadic and occasional occurring 
mostly at agenda-setting stage or at times when there is a negotiation deadlock 
threatening broader relations. In the former case, top national decision makers are 
able to initiate change in policy regime by framing policy issues in a new way and 
proposing new ideas (e.g. the agenda-setting activities by J. F. Kennedy on the eve 
of the GATT Round named after him; Mork, 2011: 9-13); in the latter case, their 
involvement was pivotal in fostering or competing negotiations (the intervention by 
L. Johnson and J. Carter, as shown below). In both cases, holding substantial 
political power, they acted as Schumpeterian leaders. 
Secondly, international trade policy bureaucrats, due to their mandate (to act as 
a guardians of the GATT; to explore the problem areas in international trade 
policy; to mediate the interests of contracting parties; and to manage the everyday 
activities of the GATT, Long, 1985), had genuine interest in preservation of the 
existing GATT regime but also in its strengthening and broadening. Given the 
mandate, their entrepreneurship was more likely to be a Kirznerianfacilitation and 
coordination. We argue, however, that in addition to Kirznerian functions which 
were performed ex officio, GATT bureaucrats also acted as Schumpeterian leaders, 
advancing negotiations, breaking the deadlocks, and ‚producing‛ international 
policy through own submission of proposals. These additional activities (as shown 
further) differed in intensity across the rounds. 
Thirdly, the degree of entrepreneurship by the middle level domestic 
bureaucrats was lower than by other actors (given the tight relations between 
protectionist interests and domestic bureaucracies). Nonetheless, Kirznerian 
consensus building entrepreneurship was made possible.  For instance, in the case 
of agricultural policy in the GATT Uruguay Round, while the majority of the 
national bureaucrats were anti-reformist, the pre-negotiation stage witnessed the 
rise of pro-reform bureaucrats, who contributed substantially to placing agriculture 
on the Uruguay Round agenda. At the core of their Kirznerian entrepreneurship 
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was the building of domestic consensus regarding the desirability of laissez faire 
agricultural policies. Although it is possible (and is done frequently) for domestic 
pro-reform bureaucrats to impose their will on anti-reform bureaucrats (i.e. to act 
as Schumpeterian leaders), we argue that the reality of agricultural policy making 
(both in the EC and the USA) was different: consultation, persuasion and 
collaboration, rather than use of confrontational tactics, were preponderant. 
Entrepreneurship by national bureaucrats continued at negotiation stage, where, in 
addition to Kirznerian consensus building, they were acting as Schumpeterian 
recombinant entrepreneurs, constructing agreement by submitting negotiation 
proposals of varying quality. 
Fourthly, regarding external stakeholders, their involvement and 
entrepreneurship in the negotiation process is linked to the issue in question: in 
highly technical negotiations (e.g. on arms control or on militarisation of space) the 
number of external stakeholders will be limited and these would include a small 
club of specialists on the issue. Other socially sensitive negotiations (e.g. on 
climate change) would include a wide range of stakeholders (NGOs, various public 
figures), usually highly motivated, driven by deep-rooted beliefs and ideology, and 
appealing to public opinion. 
We argue that trade negotiations have features of both technical complexity and 
political sensitivity (clearly, some trade negotiations, such as those on genetically 
modified organisms and food safety, are more politically divisive; whereas others, 
such as intellectual property rights negotiations, involve complex legal and 
scientific issues). The WTO Doha Round talks involved substantial political 
controversy and wide participation of external stakeholders due to its development 
orientation, the active position of the developing nations and the rise of the anti-
globalist movement. In contrast, during the GATT Uruguay Round talks the 
involvement of external actors was more limited in scope, more depoliticised and 
technically oriented. There existed some ambiguity about how to operationalise 
certain issues (e.g. define the levels of agricultural protection) and which trade 
issues to bring to the table. Substantial preliminary work in issue definition and 
quantification of the protection levels were required, and thus the involvement of 
professionals in a specific regulatory area (rather than general public or groups, 
interested in political outcome) was natural. Of several possible types of 
specialists, two stand out - lawyers and economists. 
The entrepreneurship by lawyers concerned the codification of the international 
trade law (e.g. preparation of the Code on Export Subsidies during GATT Tokyo 
Round); interdiction of adversarial trade practices such as the use of anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties. The entrepreneurial activities of lawyers were also 
salient with respect to legally undefined trade practices – before such trade issues, 
as intellectual property, investments and services were included in the Uruguay 
Round agenda, the possible agreement templates and potential rules had already 
been discussed by legal scholars in academic journals and conferences (Hampson, 
& Hart, 1995: 194-196). Codification and the write up of new rules have been an 
example of Schumpeterian recombination. 
Despite trade protectionism being an economic problem, the involvement of 
economists was limited in the early GATT years (in contrast to inter-war period, 
when trade economists assisted in germinating the idea of multilateral trade 
governance; Endres, & Fleming, 2002). One of the reasons was organizational: the 
GATT lacked similar employment opportunities for economists that existed in IMF 
and World Bank; hence the services of external economists were used most 
frequently. A more important problem was a gap that existed between theoretical 
research in international trade and applied research that could be useful in practical 
policymaking (Evenett, 2007). Many diagnostic analyses were left underutilized 
(e.g. 1957 report by G. Haberler, J. Tinbergen and R. de Oliveira Campos on the 
state of agricultural protectionism) due to the lack of operational concepts and 
estimates. The advent of computable general equilibrium modelling and applied 
econometrics allowed closing the gap and increased the role of economic advice. 
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As shown below, this latter activity was a manifestation of Schumpeterian 
recombinant entrepreneurship. 
 
4. The process of IPG provision 
We conceive IPG provision as a complex phenomenon that involves 
entrepreneurial activity 1). At both domestic and international levels; 2). During 
agenda setting (pre-negotiation) and negotiation stages; 3). During the 
accompanying institutional change. We also note certain behaviour factors and 
frames that may constrain policy entrepreneurship (the interaction of behavioural, 
institutional and entrepreneurship variables is a promising research issue not 
examined here).  
 
4.1. Entrepreneurship and five agenda setting streams 
The multiple streams model formulated by Kingdon (1995) consider three 
streams of activities during the agenda-setting: problem recognition and framing 
(problems stream), the proposal of solutions to the problem (alternatives stream), 
and political developments within the policy community (politics stream). These 
streams, being independent most of the time, may get coupled by entrepreneurs, 
thus bringing substantial policy changes. The involvement of entrepreneurs is 
rather discrete: ‚to lie in wait, in and around government with their solutions 
already in hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their 
solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to their 
advantage.‛ (p. 165). 
We argue that 1). There are more streams than in Kingdon’s original model; 2) 
A specific type of entrepreneurship is associated with each stream; and 3) The 
relation between the streams is more complex than in Kingdon’s original 
conceptualisation. 
Regarding agenda setting stage, we distinguish five activity streams with a 
specific type of entrepreneurship associated with each stream: 
1) Problem framing stream, including efforts of certain actors to challenge 
existing policy ideas and interpretations of policy reality, by introducing and 
advancing alternative interpretations. The process may potentially culminate in 
some commonly held interpretation which by no means has to be brought in by 
consent (rather than conflict and contestation) and upon which further 
discussions at the negotiation stage can be based. The analysis of activities in 
this stream will help in understanding how institutions are formed.  
2) Experimentation/learning stream, involving activities of actors to eliminate 
or reduce the magnitude of inconsistencies that pervade the existing policy 
mechanism (e.g. various internal malfunctioning, tenuous relations with 
external environment or with changed aspirations and demands of policy 
recipients). The analysis of this stream helps to establish whether understanding 
has been formed among policy actors that all possibilities for improvements 
have been exhausted in the existing policy and that more radical measures and 
changes are warranted. 
3) Advocacy stream, consisting of activities to foster the above two streams, 
by building an encompassing coalition (or coalition that is sufficiently inclusive 
to play a decisive role in agenda setting) that shares the same understanding of 
policy reality and holds similar opinion about actions to be made. The analysis 
of this stream will expose the slack in the system and the gap that exists 
between the first realisation that problems exist and the appearance of the first 
alternative ideas, and the point when a policy agenda is firmly installed. 
4) Operationalisation stream, including activities to create instruments and 
analytical apparatuses that will help actors to get a clearer idea of what the 
problems, solutions and whole discussion are about. These activities have a 
facilitative nature and are analogous to creating ‚language‛, making agenda 
setting communications and discussions easier. 
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5) Contextualisation stream, composed of activities that relate internal agenda 
setting controversies with exigencies of external political and economic 
environment. Actors in this stream will evaluate the state of the agenda setting 
debate and identify exogenous requirements that have to be satisfied. Thereby it 
will be determined when exactly the agenda setting processes have to be cut 
short and debates moved into the negotiation domain. In other words, this 
stream establishes the exact timing of negotiation and the major turning point in 
regime change process. 
We hypothesize that problem framing and institutional formation requires 
initiative and mobilisation on the part of some actors as well as their ability to 
impose (by using various tactics) their interpretations of ‚what is happening‛ and 
of ‚what ought to be done‛ on the rest of the policy system. Hence, Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurial leadership is warranted. The essence of leadership in this stream is 
in framing and counter-framing ‚to rebut, undermine, or neutralise a person’s or a 
group’s versions of reality, or interpretative framework‛ and to subsequently 
suggest different actions and solutions (Benford, & Snow, 2000: 626). The 
principal objective of holders of counter-frames is not merely to inform others 
about alternatives, but to disseminate counter-frames and make others adopt them, 
i.e. to radically reconfigure institutional (and subsequently policy) domain. This is 
in line with Schumpeter’s original view of leader-entrepreneur, driven mainly by 
non-material impulses (Fagerberg, 2003: 132). Specifically, counter-framing would 
involve normative de-legitimisation of existing policy ideology, targeted to present 
the latter as inappropriate in the eyes of society (Benford, & Snow, 2000: 614-616). 
The rhetorical appeals to ‚follow the right way‛ and to desist from currently held 
frames would likely be usual tactics.  The effectiveness of framing would likely be 
conditioned by the resonance of entrepreneurs’ arguments (ability to attract 
attention of other players and top decision makers), in turn affected by the frame’s 
consistency (identification of the precise link between specific activities and 
adverse outcomes) and credibility (persuasiveness of the critique). Following 
Benford & Snow (2000) and Hoffman & Ocasio (2001: 420-426), we argue that 
internally consistent (offering clear cut interpretations of what is wrong and why it 
has to be tackled in a particular way) and credible (not contradicting world events 
and reality and not advanced solely for demagogical and politicking purposes) 
frames are likely to be more resonant. 
The failure of International Trade Organisation (ITO) proposal in the 1940s is 
an illustration of poor framing entrepreneurship. The interpretation of the post-war 
economic problems proposed by the USA was perceived inadequate by most other 
economies: while US trade negotiators saw protectionism as a cause of the 
prolonged Great Depression and protracted post-war reconstruction, other parties 
considered lack of government intervention and aggregate demand deficiencies as a 
root of the problem (Trofimov, 2012). 
In contrast, the framing by D. Stockman, Director of the US Office of 
Management and Budget, was instrumental in changing US position in agricultural 
trade negotiations during GATT Uruguay Round (Spitze, & Flinchbaugh, 1994). 
Stockman’s frame (agricultural protection as one of the reasons of rising budget 
deficit and as a practice that is incompatible with free market mechanisms) 
resonated well with economic views of Pres. Reagan and aligned well with 
interpretations of the US economic problems by Congress members.  
In other GATT rounds, incompatible frames were likewise observed. During 
Kennedy Round, J. F. Kennedy’s vision of free trade as an instrument to strengthen 
trans-Atlantic alliance and prevent isolationist tendencies in Western Europe was 
countered by C. de Gaulle’s vision of Europe as strong independent force (Mork, 
2011: 12-13).  
The experimentation/learning stream requires that actors are able to recombine 
and tinker with the policy mechanism and its constitutive elements. Hence 
Schumpeterian recombinant entrepreneurship is necessary. Various unanticipated 
anomalies in the policy system (failures within the policy mechanism as well as 
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tensions that appear between it and other policies, policy stakeholders and 
recipients) give rise to reactions and responses by policymakers, i.e. policy 
learning. The latter is defined as deliberate attempts to adjust the goals or 
techniques of policy in light of these anomalies (Hall, 1993: 278). Hall 
distinguishes three orders of required changes and responses: changes made to the 
setting of existing instruments (first order change), adoption of new instruments 
(second order change), and modification of goals (third order change). The third 
one becomes inevitable if policy malfunctioning persists despite changes made to 
policy instruments. May (1992: 337) and Steen & Groenewegen (2008: 2, 7) argue 
that in the presence of radical uncertainty (associatedwith lack of knowledge of 
how to eliminate policy anomalies) the only way out of the situation for 
policymakers is to explore other policy paths, or to experiment through trial-and-
error. Following Oliver & Pemberton (2004) we argue that Schumpeterian 
recombinant entrepreneurs, with varying degree of success will attempt to cope 
with policy anomalies. They can manage to return the policy system to its original 
equilibrium, and hence the change process stops with all other streams rendered 
unnecessary. If not, an alternative policy regime – one with both new instruments 
and new goals – will become brought in after a period of learning and tinkering. In 
this case, the learning/experimentation stream has to be supported by a problem 
framing stream.  ‚The triumph of a new policy framework depends (obviously) on 
a workable new idea (or more likely, a set of ideas) being available‛ (Oliver, & 
Pemberton, 2004: 5), i.e. by a stable frame. At the same time both framing stream 
and learning and experimentation could be assisted by Kirznerian advocacy and 
coalition building entrepreneurship. 
The recalcitrant position of the EC in the GATT Uruguay Round agricultural 
talks was to large extend a result of unsuccessful experimentation with its domestic 
agricultural policies. Tinkering with the existing policy through supply side 
measures rather than reform of the price system (that was the cause of agricultural 
surpluses, export subsidisation and trade wars) and creation of new policy based on 
different principles and institutions were not a case of Schumpeterian recombinant 
entrepreneurship, but rather an attempt to save an old system by making minor 
adjustments to instruments (Fennell, 1997: 73, 161).   
The objective of entrepreneurship in the advocacy stream is to bridge opposing 
positions as to the necessity of regime change and attempt to persuade opponents. 
Entrepreneurship is likely to take form of Kirznerian facilitation and coordination. 
(We note inter alia that these activities are not limited to the agenda setting stage, 
but are equally important during negotiations, when reduction of the distance 
between negotiation proposals has to come about). Coalition-building and 
advocacy would support framing entrepreneurship, given that opposition has to be 
persuaded to accept new frames (no matter how credible and consistent they are); it 
will also support experimentation and learning, given that these may be too gradual 
and could have proceeded much faster if supported by an encompassing political 
coalition. Following Hutter (1986), Kuran (1988) and Gladwell (2000) we argue 
that in many instances pro-reform coalition may be built by working through 
bureaucratic apparatus and its segments; and by performing value and ideology-
based lobbying (i.e. lobbying that fosters change by non-confrontational means, 
persuasion and dialogue). Examples of the former may include bureau 
reorganisation, targeting a few critical bureaucrats or agencies that are sympathetic 
to reform, recruiting new members into the pro-reform faction, ‚shopping venues‛ 
(targeting various agencies or government branches). Examples of the latter could 
include establishing forums or venues where pro-change idea is crystallised and 
formulated by like-minded actors (Hutter called them ‚conversation circles‛). 
Kuran (1988) and Gladwell (2000) mention ‚critical mass‛ and threshold effects, 
i.e. the success of consensus building and pro-change advocacy hinges upon 
progressive expansion of the forum and inclusion of actors who are initially less 
amicable to change idea. Given that the core of the entrenched belief system is 
deeply anti-reformist in many cases and the strength of this core is formidable, the 
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intensity of persuasion is unlikely to deliver quick effects. We align with Meier & 
Durrer (1992) and argue that depoliticising the policy discussion and tackling some 
practical and pragmatic aspects of the problem would be a key to building a grand 
pro-reform coalition. It should be noted that advocacy and coalition-building 
process can be assisted by the fragmentation and demise of existing policies and 
institutions (due to counter-framing efforts and policy anomalies), i.e. relation 
between advocacy and framing and learning/experimentation streams is bi-
directional.  
The movement away from protectionist agricultural policies and pro-
liberalisation stance of the USA in the Uruguay Round were to large extent the 
result of swift and effective advocacy and consensus-building, with ‚critical mass‛ 
effect reached rather quickly. Starting in 1981in a narrow circle of like-mined 
senators (J. Helms, T. Foley, W. Alexander) and D. Stockman, it initially 
concerned limitation of budget outlays on broader agricultural programs and 
weakening entrenched urban-rural coalition (food stamps program linked with and 
farm support programs). Further on, the testimony by agricultural experts (Alex 
McCalla, Edward Schuh, F.H. Sanderson, B.L. Gardner) was instrumental in 
changing the stance of legislators, by indicating the links between domestic and 
international aspects of the policy, and importantly highlighting potential benefits 
from reduction of domestic farm supports and more pliant bargaining position in 
GATT talks (increased agricultural exports as a direct result of liberal international 
policies, or increased services exports as a by-product). Later, the coalition was 
expanded by including USDA Secretary John R. Block and Commerce Secretaries, 
John O’Mara and Clayton Yeutter, responsible for upcoming multilateral 
negotiations (US Congress, 1981; US Congress, 1983; US Congress, 1986). Such 
coalition was lacking in the EC, explaining the delays in the Uruguay Round 
agricultural talks and important role of entrepreneurship by top EC leaders to 
overcome opposition to free agricultural trade. 
The construction of new instruments and ‚language‛ in the operationalisation 
stream makes it necessary that actors (specifically, expert community) innovate; 
therefore, Schumpeterian recombination has to take place. Slembeck (1997) and 
Evenett (2007) mention the cognitive and behavioural distance between the 
‚world‛ of politicians and the ‚world‛ of economists, with politicians pointing to 
the lack of knowledge of political and administrative system by economists, and 
economists blaming politicians for inefficiency and irrationality. Reduction of this 
distance is achieved by Schumpeterian operationalisation entrepreneurship. Its 
essence is the creation of analytical instruments, models and empirical studies 
based on them, as well as the construction of frameworks that could facilitate 
policymaking. The former is required because applied economic concepts that 
could be used in policymaking have to be distilled from the body of economic 
theory and adapted to policy realities. The latter is necessary because policymakers 
are frequently deficient in their ability to organise and arrange issues for talks 
(advice by economists on the issues that are the most/the least divisive or distorting 
in economic sense can be instrumental in this case). We argue that effectiveness of 
operationalisation entrepreneurship was achieved when empirical estimates and 
figures that had been presented to policy makers allowed for a more concrete and 
specific policy reform discussion.Entrepreneurship was particularly effective in 
instances when policy economists managed, in addition to providing crude 
aggregate estimates of welfare, to address in their empirical studies the changes in 
specific variables of importance to policymakers and the wider community 
(unemployment rate, inequality and the like), thus scattering the doubts about 
negative impacts of policy change. 
The success of Uruguay Round in fostering agricultural trade liberalisation to a 
large extent was a result of particularly intense entrepreneurship and recombinant 
activities by economists. This was in sharp contrast to Dillon and Kennedy Round, 
when report by a group of economists (‚Harberler Report‛) did not go further 
beyond mere diagnostic of the agricultural trade policy problem and broad 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 4(4), I.D. Trofimov, p.473-501. 
490 
recommendations (Haberler, 1958). At the start of the Uruguay Round, a number 
of analytical instruments were devised and applied to assist policymakers: 
encompassing measures of agricultural support, Producer Subsidy Equivalents 
(PSE) and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents (CSE), to indicate the overall scale of 
distortions; as well as equivalence measures between quantitative supports and 
tariffs (that later allowed more meaningful bargaining and concessions over 
particular instruments). General equilibrium models facilitated discussion over 
liberalisation scenarios, country-specific and social impacts (OECD, 1982; IATRC, 
1988/1989). 
Finally, in contextualisation stream, the recognition of the right timing for the 
conclusion of agenda setting and the start of negotiations requires that actors are 
alert enough to discern this moment. The alertness ability is central to Kirzner’s 
view of entrepreneurship: alertness is defined as awareness of opportunities and ‚of 
what has been overlooked‛ and the ability ‚in seeing through the fog created by the 
uncertainty of the future‛ (Kirzner, 1997: 51). Ability to detect propitious moments 
for policy change or for moving policymaking forward is thus a manifestation of 
Kirznerian entrepreneurship. Snyder & Diesing (1977) distinguish integrative and 
distributive crises: the former being exogenous situations that threaten the 
distribution of gains and losses across a policy domain, thereby leading to 
differential willingness of parties to tackle it through cooperation; the latter defined 
as situations that enhance perceptions of mutual vulnerability and possible joint 
losses and that promote the idea that minimisation of adverse effects requires joint 
effort. They likewise distinguished specific and general crises: the former affecting 
a limited number of actors domestically or internationally; the latter affecting 
everyone located in the international policy system. Also the crises at different 
stages of the ‚life cycle‛ are defined: nascent crises or wake-up calls, not requiring 
immediate attention; chronic crises; and acute crises. We argue that Kirznerian 
entrepreneurship in the contextualisation stream takes place when agents start to 
perceive adverse exogenous developments as an integrative, general and acute 
crisis, i.e. expose high degree of alertness and act accordingly to initiate/foster the 
change. 
The ITO proposal (and the idea of comprehensive liberalisation embedded in it) 
was not considered as the priority in the late 1940s. The economic growth revived 
in Europe (with the help of Marshall Plan and Keynesian policies) and other 
developments are crises came to the agenda - the onset of Cold War and Korean 
War. The grand liberalisation was not seen as necessary or pressing, thus 
compromising Kirznerian entrepreneurship in the contextualisation stream (indeed 
the early GATT rounds in the 1940s that were conducted parallel to ITO talks were 
seen sufficient in bringing in trade liberalisation).  
In contrast, the start of the agricultural trade talks in the GATT in 1986 was a 
result from a dire situation: trade war between the USA and the EC and cut-throat 
competition in agricultural export markets, that negatively affected broader 
Transatlantic relations, massive agricultural surpluses and budgetary outlays on 
agricultural support, GATT judicial mechanism under strain etc. 
 
4.2. Entrepreneurship during negotiation stage 
Negotiation literature tends to examine negotiation outcomes from structural, 
strategic, processual, behavioural and integrative perspectives (Zartman, 1988; 
Druckman, 1997). In the structural approach, the power of the parties, the relational 
context and the setting of negotiation come to the forefront. In the strategic model, 
the goals of the parties, the payoffs, and rational choice among alternative courses 
of action are accentuated. Behavioural approach emphasises the negotiators’ 
personalities and negotiating styles, as well as the role of persuasion, culture, 
perceptions, motivation and other qualitative variables. The patterns of concession-
making, the reactions to opponents’ bids and offers and the learning about 
concessions’ exchanges are the essence of the processual approach. Integrative 
models stress collective decision-making and conflict resolution efforts and focus 
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on value creation in negotiations (as opposed to value claiming). In addition, the 
view of negotiation as organisational process (specifically a process of complexity 
reduction) is advanced (Winham, 1977).  
Fostering negotiations and bringing in required outcomes can thus be ensured 
by the increase in bargaining power, superior strategic and tactical action, by 
means of cooperative attitudes. However, when it comes to comes to achieving 
timely and mutually-satisfactory completion of negotiation, a different set of 
instruments is likely to be most effective: the management of the negotiation 
process, collective search for mutually acceptable solutions and avoidance of 
unattractive solutions, formulation of negotiating rules and procedures, structuring 
of talks, prioritization of the issues and the like. These latter instruments (which are 
a common thread in organisational process and integrative approaches) need 
further and more in-depth explanation. International policy entrepreneurship, in our 
opinion, is a natural extension of the organisational process view. 
We note that the view of negotiation as an organisational process envisages the 
creation of rules and routines, the following of a programmed set of operations, the 
incremental building of a negotiation package (Winham, 1977: 98-100). Most 
negotiations, being complex undertakings, will involve these activities; however, 
wide variation in outcomes and in the time spent or reaching the agreements would 
require consideration of entrepreneurship as an intermediate variable. It is not the 
organisational process (management of the negotiation) as such, but rather an 
exercise of entrepreneurship (qualitative improvements taking the form of 
facilitation, recombination or leadership) that increase the speed of negotiation and 
bring quality outcomes. Indeed, both Kirzner and Schumpeter make a distinction 
between routine behaviour within a particular setting, and deliberate actions to 
change the setting and correct inconsistencies in the setting. The exercise of 
entrepreneurship is implicit in organisational process theory, but needs further 
analysis (Winham, 1977: 100-107): problem-solving search necessitates 
Schumpeterian tinkering and experimentation, while the reconciliation of 
conflicting positions (that, according to Winham, is a mechanical and programmed 
process) is performed through Schumpeterian leadership and Kirznerian 
facilitation. (Whether negotiations resemble mechanical process, or in contrast 
require greater entrepreneurship is a separate issue to be explored).  
The time spent and efforts made to complete a negotiation may serve as an 
indicator of the intensity of entrepreneurship, with talks competed in timely manner 
suggesting the policy entrepreneurship had been exercised. This, however, may not 
be a perfect indicator, as parties could complete negotiation by leaving certain 
important (and divisive) issues aside(as was the case in Tokyo Round, when 
agricultural policy matters were postponed and put in a separate negotiation group, 
and as a result were left unregulated, Winham, 1986: 95). Thus, the lengthy 
Uruguay Round (1986-94) is an indication of high complexity of talks (and hence a 
high degree of entrepreneurship, rather than its absence). A better indicator of 
entrepreneurship would be the quality of IPG, i.e. the stability of the negotiated 
governance regime, the absence of conflicts following its negotiation, the 
comprehensiveness and sophistication of policy instruments. Clearly, the ever-
present dilemma exists between entrepreneurship types – facilitation and leadership 
may reduce negotiation period and lower the costs of IPG provision at the expense 
of innovation and IPG quality (e.g. comparison of GATT Tokyo and Uruguay 
Rounds, the latter being a qualitative leap in international trade governance).  
At the negotiation stage of the IPG provision Kirznerian entrepreneurship 
remains important. It involves facilitative activities to overcome domestic 
opposition to liberal policies (through the use of various influence instruments in 
domestic political environments) and to build domestic consensus through less 
conflictual means, as well as to foster collaboration between contracting parties. 
The importance of considering both negotiation tables (negotiation with 
international counterparts and negotiation with domestic constituents) was 
highlighted by Putnam (1988). Pointing to domestic constraints that prevent policy 
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makers from making concessions and concluding agreements, Putnam also 
considered the ways to overcome these constraints, e.g. by constructing ratifiable 
agreements through linkage of issues and negotiation areas, by making domestic 
side payments to own constituents and induce them ratify agreement, and also by 
attempting to inflict necessary changes in the domestic policy system of the 
counterparts. The latter means was studied extensively by Schoppa (1997): 
synergistic strategies, i.e. strategies targeted not directly at the opponent in 
international negotiations, but rather used to modify domestic preferences, were 
seen as power tools to move negotiation forward.  
We argue that this manipulation of domestic constraints (Schoppa mentions 
four synergistic strategies - threats, reverberation, restructuring of domestic 
constraints and tying hands) and the exercise of strategic influence is a mechanism 
of Kirznerian entrepreneurship. While taking the form of dialogue-based advocacy 
and coalition-building and involving bureaucratic regrouping at the agenda-setting 
stage, at negotiation stage it was a combination of inducements and threats. In both 
instances, the ultimate goal was to correct over-optimism and over-pessimism 
mistakes and facilitate the policymaking process.   
Kirznerian entrepreneurship is supplemented by Schumpeterian-type activities.  
Firstly, international bureaucrats (e.g. in GATT/WTO, IMF or UN) and, to a 
much lesser extent, national negotiators, may manage to submit innovative 
proposals that could mark a departure from the earlier protectionist stance 
(Schumpeterian recombinant entrepreneurship constructing a new policy). During 
international trade talks policy recombinant entrepreneurs also build from bits and 
pieces of their own and other negotiators’ proposals some agreement that could 
resolve international trade policy contradictions and deliver an IPG. 
Secondly, the activities of top national and international officials bring 
necessary leadership and political will to successfully conclude the negotiation and 
sign the agreement that will bring IPG into being, i.e. they behave as 
Schumpeterian leaders-entrepreneurs. 
Regarding Schumpeterian recombination at negotiation stage, it is necessary to 
distinguish between a routine and an entrepreneurial approach to negotiations. The 
former, which is the most common type of behaviour during negotiations, is 
responsible for most of its deadlocks and stalemates. There exist several 
manifestations of this approach. Firstly, as most negotiations involve several issues 
and variables to agree upon, the negotiators behaving routinely frequently attempt 
to embrace all issues and variables at once. Secondly, routine negotiators are 
usually influenced by some divisive trade conflicts and problems that preceded 
negotiation and react by attempting to solve these conflicts first, although it might 
have been preferable to concentrate on other less ‚toxic‛ issues. Thirdly, routine 
negotiators are unable to extend their decision-making horizons to see how the 
agreement would look as a whole. In contrast, Schumpeterian recombinant 
entrepreneur would construct proposals and agreement by breaking the complexity 
of the negotiation issue into workable and manageable parts and prioritising them, 
depending on their potential to block negotiation (least obstructive first, most 
obstructive last), while at the same time seeing a bigger picture and broader context 
of the talks. These activities would obviously hinge on entrepreneur’s ability to see 
ex ante which agreement of proposal will prove superior and instrumental in 
concluding negotiation and delivering IPG. As put by Schumpeter (1961[1911]: 
85) ‚intuition, the capacity of seeing things in a way which afterwards proves to be 
true‛ is a core quality of a recombinant entrepreneur, making him/her different 
from non-entrepreneurs, who are deficient in this respect and make the above 
mentioned mistakes. 
Many of the GATT/WTO rounds were opened in a non-imaginative, ‚routine‛ 
fashion, with the most recent divisive trade problems occupying the agenda (Grains 
Agreement wrangle and ‚American Selling Price‛/ASP conflict in chemical sector 
talks during the Kennedy Round, or US Export Enhancement Program during the 
Uruguay Round) and dictating particular treatment of other issues, thereby initially 
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decreasing the possibility of a qualitative breakthrough in early stages (Lee, 1999: 
111-2). Additional explanation to the lack of progress initially could be the 
setbacks in problem framing, operationalisation and other problems carried from 
the agenda-setting stage. The tasks of resolving trade conflicts and of writing trade 
rules (provision of IPG) were frequently completed in parallel, and for some time 
the entrepreneurial efforts were diverted from a principal task. 
The cursory and exploratory look at the GATT/WTO rounds suggests that they 
differed in terms of the overall degree of intensity of entrepreneurship, its strength 
at particular stages of the negotiation and it effectiveness. As put by Winham, the 
standard approach in each round was to reorganise the talks into specific working 
groups (Winham, 1979: 197-8). Entrepreneurial efforts were coming to fore, when 
negotiations reached deadlock.  
For instance, in the Kennedy Round (1963-67), GATT Director General E. 
Wyndham-White took initiative in both formal and informal groups in May 1967 
during the final stage of the round. The least divisive issues (cotton textiles, and 
most of the industrial products) were dealt with first, while the most divisive 
(chemicals and agriculture) treated last. After that, Wyndham-White devised a 
complex deal – conversion of ASP to normal valuation system to calculate duties, 
coupled with reduction of road taxes in Belgium, France and Italy, tobacco 
preferences in the UK, and reductions in various non-trade barriers (La Barca, 
2016: 7-8; Coppolaro, 2013: 195). 
In contrast, during Tokyo Round, the entrepreneurship by GATT Director 
General (O. Long) was limited: Tallberg (2006: 189-90) mentions that no zone of 
agreement existed in early stages, while at later stages such zone was wide. Thus, 
facilitation was not possible at early stages, and was not needed at later stages. In 
addition, the approach by O. Long was to allow US and EC negotiators sort out 
problematic issues informally (Hampson, & Hart, 1995: 191). 
In the Uruguay Round, the leadership by A. Dunkel, the GATT Director 
General, was substantial again (Paemen, & Bensch, 1995). Extensive facilitation 
and brokerage prevented the failure of the round after the breakdown of ministerial 
conferences in Montreal in December 1988 and in Brussels in December 1990. 
Dunkel was also engaged in entrepreneurial recombination (a rather rare case in the 
GATT rounds), preparing a draft text of the final agreement that was used as a 
working document in 1992-1994. 
The entrepreneurship by top national figures was typically up to the task. For 
instance, US presidents played pivotal roles in the GATT Rounds. The deadlock in 
the Kennedy Round in May 1967 was resolved through intervention by L. Johnson, 
who pushed US trade negotiator (W. M. Roth) to accept some of the EC demands 
(Lee, 1999: 112) and also imposed deadlines on US trade negotiators (Coppolaro, 
2013: 192). The leadership by J. Carter was instrumental in the Tokyo Round as 
well: the talks were re-invigorated in 1977, when US President reassured EC party 
that agricultural issues would be treated by the USA separately from other 
negotiation elements (Winham, 1986: 165-6). The costs of completing negotiation 
were thereby reduced and the round was completed in 1979: this, however, came at 
the expense of not achieving regulatory deal in agricultural trade (the task carried 
over to Uruguay Round). 
The entrepreneurship by lower-level bureaucrats varied too. In the Kennedy 
Round, J. Rey, EC negotiator, was effective in Kirznerian entrepreneurship, 
maintaining a dialogue with EC members and stakeholders, explaining the benefits 
and potential threats if the round is not completed (Coppolaro, 2013: 191). At 
times, he was exercising leadership, as was the case when Ray offered concessions 
to the US on tobacco and canned fruit without consultation with EC member states 
and EC Council of Ministers (Coppolaro, 2013: 188). 
We note failures of entrepreneurial recombination. As documented by Tallberg 
(2006: 192), the efforts to create a draft document may have opposite effects, 
accentuating the differences in positions, when the trade conflict is acute (as was 
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the case of the chair of WTO General Council, Ali Tchumo during WTO Doha 
Round). 
The failure of several types of entrepreneurship also occurred in the GATT 
history. The ITO initiative and its subsequent failure is a prominent example of too 
ambitious undertaking supported by too little entrepreneurship. Intended as a 
regulatory organ with a task to preclude destabilizing forces of protectionism that 
reigned in the 1930s (and exacerbated the Great Depression and arguably paved the 
road to world war), ITO idea was not aligned with dominant frames and political 
and economic context of the time (as shown above). Importantly it was not 
supported by policy entrepreneurship. 
Firstly, the inability of US President H. Truman to make ITO proposal palatable 
to the US Congress and resultant rejection of the ITO draft Charter led to rejection 
of the Charter by other parties (Milner, 1997: 139). The limited leadership at 
international talks was manifested by the absence of a strong ideational 
entrepreneur who could support free trade idea, exposing its benefits and building 
relevant coalitions. This was in contrast to other post-war regulatory bodies (e.g. 
the pivotal role of H. Morgenthau in the Bretton-Woods Conferences). 
Secondly, in terms of entrepreneurial recombination, the US negotiators 
submitted templates and organisational blueprints for ITO that were too stringent in 
legal and organisational sense and hence deemed not acceptable by other parties. 
The blunt and ambitious liberalization proposal by the US did not accommodate 
the specific realities of European and developing economies: country-specific and 
protracted paths of post-war reconstruction; the unsettled direction and nature of 
trade flows post-war; a complex mix of emerging regulatory instruments (direct 
state administration, maintenance of private cartels, exchange controls). Overall, 
for a world economic system in disarray a more flexible trade regulation was 
needed (Heilperin, 1950; Dam, 1970: 15-16). 
Thirdly, Kirznerian facilitation or influence through synergistic strategies was 
limited too: despite enormous political and economic power in the 1940s, the US 
negotiators eagerly conceded to alternative proposals (e.g. import quota and 
balance of payments clauses by the UK, import restrictions to promote economic 
development by Inia and Cuba, among others), thereby eroding the initial liberal 
ITO draft by the US,  cluttering it with contradictions  and dispensations and 
making virtually unratifiable (Heilperin, 1948: 4). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper considered several issues pertaining to the provision of international 
public goods (IPGs).  
Firstly, a specific type of IPGs was defined and characterized, the ‚governance 
IPG‛ (alternatively defined as a global policy outcome or international governance 
regime). It was shown that this IPG type possesses unique characteristics that make 
it different from other IPGs, particularly when IPG production is concerned. 
Secondly, international cooperationneeded to obtain ‚governance IPG‛ was 
conceptualized broadly as a set of multiple adjustments and changes at domestic 
and international level, across several activity streams and at both agenda setting 
and negotiation stages.  
Thirdly, the problem of equilibrium and disequilibria in international 
governance was examined. International policy entrepreneurship was defined as a 
set of activities targeted to eliminate or moderate governance disequilibria (with 
respect to both policy institutions and policy instruments and mechanisms). The 
concept was elaborated based on the contributions of I.M. Kirzner and J.A. 
Schumpeter in economics. Three principal entrepreneurial roles were outlined – 
leadership, facilitation (coordination) and recombination. These roles are 
complementary, ensuring that disequilibria are reduced using multiple means and 
from several directions. Policy entrepreneurship was viewed as ubiquitous and 
idiosyncratic activity, with multiple agents performing entrepreneurial functions. A 
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tentative classification of policy entrepreneurs and roles in the field of international 
trade governance was proposed.  
Fourthly, policy entrepreneurship during the agenda setting and negotiation was 
considered. For this purpose, the existing models (‚multiple streams model‛ of J. 
Kingdon and ‚negotiation as management process‛ by G. Winham) were extended. 
We identified five agenda setting streams, each involving the exercise of 
entrepreneurship. Regarding the relationship between streams, we argue that their 
role in agenda setting is differentiated. Without the problem framing and 
experimentation/learning streams no agenda setting will be possible (if problems 
are not defined and if actors are not attempting to change existing policies in some 
way, no new agendas will be set and the policy will persist). Hence, 
entrepreneurship in these two streams is a necessary condition for initiating regime 
dynamics. However, it is not sufficient, as without active advocacy and facilitation 
of agenda processes, creation of adequate analytical instruments and recognition of 
the timing issues and broader context, the agenda setting may turn excessively 
lengthy, amorphous and inconclusive. Thus, we argue that while activities in 
problem framing and experimentation/learning streams determine the mere 
feasibility of policy regime change, the other three streams condition its practical 
likelihood. Entrepreneurship at the negotiation stage was seen to condition the 
actual form of the ‚governance IPG‛. Entrepreneurial leadership and facilitation 
were instrumental in timely completion of the talks and in the reduction of 
negotiation costs. Entrepreneurial recombination was crucial in delivering the 
quality IPG.  
Finally, some preliminary analysis was conducted, demonstrating the exercise 
of policy entrepreneurship (or its absence) in several instances of the GATT/WTO 
trade policy making. It was shown that timely provision of a quality ‚governance 
IPG‛ (liberal trade policy regime) hinges on the continuous exercise of all three 
types of policy entrepreneurship.  
Overall, international policy entrepreneurship is neither limited to simple 
awaiting of opportunities with ready solutions at hand, nor is it exercised 
discretely, nor is it restricted to a single actor. Instead we argue that 
entrepreneurship would be exercised continuously: at any point of time and in 
every stream, entrepreneurial activity would be exercised by several actors. 
Methodologically, the paper introduces an outline for interdisciplinary research 
in international governance by merging several literature streams from the fields of 
political economy, public policy and international relations. The analytical 
framework introduced in the paper also considers the complexity of international 
policymaking. The specific contribution of the paper has been the focus on agency 
in international policy making,  making it a central component of policy change, in 
contrast to approaches that focus on factors that are incidental or of secondary 
importance to policy analysis or do not truly explain it. The concept of 
entrepreneurship would allow a more detailed and structured analysis of the 
dynamics and agency in international governance. 
The concept of international policy entrepreneurship (and policy 
entrepreneurship in general)can be elaborated in several directions. Firstly, further 
clarification of entrepreneurial roles and the classification of entrepreneurs may be 
needed, given that Kirznerian and Schumpeterian views of entrepreneurship are 
rather idiosyncratic. Secondly, the position of entrepreneurs in political and policy 
networks can potentially affect entrepreneurs’ political capital and power, and 
respectively the effectiveness of entrepreneurship (Christopoulos 2006). The 
proposed framework will thus need to incorporate the analysis of networks.  
Thirdly, it is necessary to consider how behavioural variables constrain or enable 
entrepreneurship, specifically the integrative versus distributive orientation, risk 
attitudes, perceptions of the gains and losses. The contributions from the 
behavioural theory of negotiations, as well as prospect theory (Kahneman, & 
Tversky, 1979) can be instrumental in this regard. Fourthly, an in-depth analysis of 
the personal characteristics and attributes of entrepreneurs (rhetorical ability, 
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foresight, persistence, alertness, negotiating skills) may be justified, if an actor-
centered perspective on policy-making is adopted, and if explanation is needed as 
to why certain entrepreneurs are more effective than others. In addition, more 
fundamental question will need to be answered: are entrepreneurial functions and 
actions complementary (as postulated in this paper), or there is clash and 
competition between them; in what situations (negotiation type) particular 
entrepreneurial function is more salient, e.g. incremental recombinant 
entrepreneurship versus entrepreneurial leadership; what underlying motivation of 
entrepreneurs dominates (self-interest or genuine desire to improve policies). 
 
 
Notes 
 
iThis paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first attempt to apply policy entrepreneurship concept 
to the analysis of international governance. The study by Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) considers 
international diffusion of policy ideas by policy entrepreneur, but does not examine the issue of the 
formation of governance regime.  
ii The terms ‚provision‛ and ‚production‛ of IPGs are used interchangeably, albeit the former term is 
preferable, given multiple logics and processes, not limited to economic one. 
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